Whitney Tilson 問 Charlie Munger 在沽空 MBIA上的意見

作者Whitney Tilson說了他在沽空路上的一個故事，Charlie Munger的回答所顯出的智慧實在令人敬佩:

In 2002, Bill Ackman researched financial-services giant MBIA (MBI) and concluded that it was a house of cards. He shorted the stock and published an in-depth report titled "Is MBIA Triple-A?" I thought Bill's analysis was correct, so I also shorted the stock and was publicly critical of the company.

In response, the company planted a negative story in the Wall Street Journal about Bill and me, claiming that we were part of a nefarious group of market-manipulating short-sellers.

As if that wasn't bad enough, only four days later, I received subpoenas from both the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the office of New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer. Both regulators had obviously read the WSJ story and were following up, demanding all of my e-mails, trading records, research, etc.

I knew I hadn't done anything wrong. Nevertheless, I feared that the bad publicity and these two investigations might put me out of business.

Panicked, I called Warren Buffett for advice. He basically told me, "This too shall pass," and suggested that I speak to his long-time partner, Charlie Munger.

I had never spoken with him, so I asked, "Does he even know who I am?"

Buffett chuckled and said, "Oh, yes, he knows who you are. Give him a call."

So I did – and, to my surprise, his secretary put me right through to him. I still remember his exact words. He started by saying, "You and Bill are absolutely right on MBIA. The idea that anyone would ever think that MBIA is triple-A is so ludicrous!"

He spat out the last two words and continued:

"From a societal perspective, what you and Bill are doing [to expose MBIA] is great."

At this point, I was feeling pretty good. My hero was complimenting me!

But then, he cautioned: "But if you go through life stepping on people's air hoses, they're going to hate you and attack you. So my advice to Whitney Tilson is, don't do it."

Then, he reflected on his own experiences short-selling decades earlier. "I shorted three stocks in my life and they eventually worked out," he said, "but not before running against me and causing me total misery. So I stopped."

He concluded with a phrase I'll never forget: "But every young guy seems to have to learn this for himself..."

He was saying this to himself as much as to me, because he knew I was so full of myself that I wasn't going to listen to him. That's how wise he is... and how dumb I was. My failure to listen to Munger eventually brought me to ruin...

我也犯了這個很多價值投資者都犯的錯誤...

4月12日阿里巴巴集團電話會議節錄，加最新估值

4月12日阿里巴巴集團因被罰而舉行電話會議(Administrative Penalty Decision Conference Call)，以下是一些節錄。

被罰的撮要:

As you have seen on April 10, Alibaba Group received the Administrative Penalty Decision issued by the State Administration for Market Regulation of the People's Republic of China. The State Administration for Market Regulation, which we refer to as SAMR, is the regulatory agency that is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law of China. The Anti-Monopoly Law, we will refer to here as the AML.

The penalty decision was the result of an investigation that was commenced in December 2020 relating to activities that would be prohibited under the AML. Specifically, under Article 17 clause 4 of the AML, a business operator that has a dominant market position is prohibited from restricting business counterparties by requiring exclusive arrangements without justifiable cause. The penalty decision described the results of SAMR's investigation and concluded that Alibaba was in violation of Article 17 clause 4 of the AML.

As a result, under the remediation and penalty provisions of the AML, the SAMR issued the following actions: number one, Alibaba as a platform operator shall not restrict merchants from doing business or running promotions on competitor platforms. In this connection, the SAMR provided administrative guidance for Alibaba to implement a comprehensive program of rectification, including strictly fulfilling our responsibility as a platform operator, strengthening our internal controls and compliance, upholding fair competition and protecting the interests of our platforms, consumers and merchants.

The second action that the SAMR imposed on Alibaba is a monetary penalty of CNY 18.2 billion or approximately USD 2.8 billion. The penalty decision stated that this amount is based on applying 4% -- applying a 4% rate to Alibaba Group's calendar 2019 revenues derived from China. To put this into perspective, under the AML, monetary penalties of up to 10% of revenues can be imposed at the discretion of the authorities. The amount of the penalty is less than 20% of the free cash flow of Alibaba Group in the latest 12 months. We will pay this penalty out of our available liquidity, which, as of December 31, 2020, stood at approximately USD 70 billion in cash, cash equivalents and short-term investments.

關於財務impact:

we will further strengthen our focus on customer value creation and consumer experience. And we will -- so in this regard, we will continue to introduce new measures to lower -- first, to lower the entry barriers and business cost of our merchants on our platform. So I think in this regard, we will do more to help our merchants, including brand partners and retailers, to reduce their operating cost on our platform.

For example, during the past few months, we've already, step-by-step, waiving some technology service fee, as we usually do. Even in previous years, we always do that. Like for standard software services with mature technologies, we will waive the technology service fee, while at the same time with the continuous improvement of the technology and upgrading of the technology, we have most premium tech services available for our client. But we still -- this is still a paid service.

So over years, more and more mature services will be free, and we will offer new services. But the key thing is to give our merchants more tools, more services for them to run a business on our platform with lower cost. And on the other hand, we will also invest more to improve the -- for example, the merchant training and also for the merchant growth and to optimize their back-end workstation on our platform...we will incur additional costs, and we will -- but we don't view this as a one-off cost. But we view it as a necessary investment to enable our merchants to have a better operation on our platform. So we will do this from these 2 sides

...

we're going to both reduce fees and charges to help merchants and brands, at the same time also invest and spend more for them. So the impact going to be both reflected in both top line and bottom line. So overall, we have reserved billions of RMB in additional annual spending to support initiatives in the future year. 

關於商家和客戶retention impact:

We have hundreds of millions of users and millions of merchants with us. And our consumer purchasing power is over like RMB 900[0] per year and which demonstrate to all the merchants that we have the -- all the sectors of the consumers with us and including the sectors who has the most powerful consumption power. So -- and I think that's the key reason why all these merchants are with us. And over years, we work together and we grow with each other. And for Alibaba, it's very clear that we provide the value to the merchant for their growth and for their consumer education, consumer connection and a lot of merchant service back end. And we don't rely on exclusivity to retain our merchants.

And if you look at the exclusivity arrangement before, I would say this only cover a couple of -- a number of Tmall flagship stores, which directly operate by brands. But actually, today, all the merchants, they have these multi-platform strategies. And either they work with platform like us with the direct operation by flagship store format or they have their operation or distribution business in other platform or they have their distributors to run the so-called flagship in other platform. So business-wise, we don't think -- we don't expect material negative impact on the change of this arrangement. And once again, we will continue to work with our merchants, provide them with the necessary services, better services they need to grow their business on our platform.

其他手尾?

So the regulators are -- have increased on mergers, acquisitions and strategic investment transactions as part of their merger control review process. And the entire industry, including several of our peers' companies, are also subject to the same review. Other than the merger control review on investment transactions, we're not aware of any other investigations relating to the Anti-Monopoly Law.

其他問題:

how would you encourage global investors to think about the regulatory environment and the competitive intensity in this new phase not just for Alibaba but for the technology sector in general? And what should we expect this would mean or might mean or could possibly mean for equity valuations and opportunities for global investors on a go-forward basis?

[T]his action is very clear, and the regulators' communication to the public is very clear that they're affirming our business model. There's this phrase called the platform economies and/or platform operators, and our business model as a platform is actually fully endorsed and affirmed by the authorities that this kind of model is good for the growth of the country's economy and also helps promote innovation. So we feel very comfortable that there's nothing wrong with our business, the fundamental business model of the platform company. And these regulatory actions are undertaken to ensure fair competition in order to benefit the public, the consumers, the merchants, all the constituencies in a platform economy. So we're -- so with this penalty decision, we've received a good guidance on some of the specific issues under the Anti-Monopoly Law. And I would say that we are pleased that we're able to put this matter behind us.

So I think in terms of how global investors should view our -- the industry as a whole and also the regulations of the industry is that, number one, large-scale Internet companies are doing a lot of good things for the economy, to help grow the economy, that in China, specifically, the policy of focusing on digitizing the economy to benefit -- to lower the barriers for average citizens to access products and services is very, very clear. And we're playing in the middle of this, promoting that government policy.

So the -- from a regulatory standpoint, I think every large-scale technology company will face -- in our case, we have experienced this scrutiny, and we're happy to get the matter behind us. But I think on a going forward basis, globally, the trend is that regulators will be more keen to look at some of the areas where you could have unfair competition. So I think the good thing about this is that we are -- we have gone through this process with the regulators. We've gotten to know their thinking very well. It's a very healthy process, and we have a very established plan for correcting some of the practices. And also, we have established very good internal control and compliance systems to continue to comply with the law.

個人意見

阿里的電商生意雖然會繼續是龍頭，但確實給削弱了，盈利能力也減弱了一點，這些會在估值中反應。

以之前管理層的估值為藍本，阿里的估值可以這樣計:

Taobao + Tmall (marketplace-based core commerce): $32 billion USD。之前管理層用25倍，我用20倍，這塊值$640 billion

螞蟻的1/3，估計: $20 billion

$45 billion的其他投資

阿里雲，假設穩定後profit margin 10%，P/E 40，那P/S就是4。2020年revenue: $8.3 billion，這塊值: $33 billion

總共是: $640 + 20 + 45 + 33 = $738 billion，用2.8 billion ADS計，每股$263。

其他免費：盒馬、菜鳥、餓了麼、口碑等等。另外高德、優酷土豆等等。還有$30 billion之上net cash。要留意的是，阿里的自駕技術(最少在不載客的情況下)應該已接近level 4，靠高德+千尋+達摩院+平頭哥，這部份也沒計入估值。

個人仍然認為市值$1 trillion以下的阿里可以隨便買，即每股$357。

2021年第一季總結

 I. 組合回報

跟2020年第四季比：

組合回報: -4.58% (用simple Dietz method計，因為懶得用modified Dietz method)

SPY回報: 6.24%

槓杆：1.16 (股票市值 / Net Asset Value，數字未必充份反應組合中沽的put/call options)

II. 2021年第一季市場回顧

最近比較忙，市場回顧簡短一點。

中概股delist風險

中國三大電商China Mobile, Unicom, Telecom，給NYSE彈出彈入，最後還是delist。SEC開始擬定增加中概股在美上市的規則，要證明和中國政府無關、要用US GAAP等等。大型中概股應該沒有問題，畢竟華爾街也要賺錢，希望SEC和業界商議後知道自己白痴，放棄再對中概股施壓，stop all asian hates!

新冠疫情

隨着打疫苗，美國疫情轉好，新增病例減少，不過在季尾時可能有些驕傲，重開得太快，一些州份新增病例有所增加。民主國家裡，美國算是做得比較好的一國，歐州國家如德國、意大利、法國仍然要在某程度上的封城。

普遍舊經濟股有重開憧景，今季強烈反彈，如能源、零售、酒旅、戲院等等。

要留意的是美國的失業率比上年疫情開始時已經大幅降低，是實實在在的經濟復甦：

美國十年國債息口升

由季初不夠1%，去到季尾1.7%左右，美國十年國債息的上升引致一些增長股殺估值，加上疫情轉輕，新經濟股的資金轉去舊經濟股，不少2020抽爆機的股票在二月尾三月頭經歷了小股災，在三月尾收復了一部份失地，YTD來說還是升了不少。

聯儲長Powell承諾不到2023年不加息，所以估計債息上升應該去到尾聲，今年到2%有可能，但不會再升太多。

拜登上場，如預期地派錢

美國大市在2021年一創新高，民主黨不斷派錢和政府提出大搞基建對股市功不可沒。美國可以用債務支持經濟多久沒人知道，但現時股市正在享受所有consumption的利好，美債將來會不會爆沒人會擔心。

Gamestop，AMC等的瘋狂崛起

Reddit wallstreetbets和Robinhood烏合之眾發現可以聯合起來corner一些short ratio高的股票，加上一些小基金神助功，將Gamestop, AMC等的股票推上高位，而且不只一浪，威力驚人，不少大型對沖基金虧損，Melvin Capital曾經一度損失53%。

我沒有冷靜地對待這次瘋狂，以為可以做空撿便宜，結果損失慘重，下面會有敍述。

Bitcoin, Dogecoin, NFT，虛擬貨幣爆升

Bitcoin三個月升一倍，因上升而上升造成positive spiral，Twitter大V Elon Musk和Ark女股神Catherine Wood功不可沒。

我試過加入，但心理承受不了，每次賺個麥當努套餐就走人，決定還是不要碰好了。

Bill Hwang 的Archegos Capital Management爆倉

因為高槓杆，所以爆倉，賤價拋售股票，一堆中概股給殺個20-30%，其中直接受害比較多的是BIDU、TME、VIPS、Discover、Viacom、GSX。

III. 2021年第一季投資回顧概述和未來展望

本季組合主要持股表現：

(本季的持股變化很大，所以以上未能反映組合整體的表現。我UPST有相對$100的covered calls十月到期，所以以上的升幅我沒有完全享受到。在4月1日，我賣掉所有ET，而在同一天，我的$230 BABA puts給assign，所以當天結束時 BABA佔淨資產17.81%)

今季我非常失敗。在Gamestop事件上因為用naked short calls做空，損失慘重，還被逼賣了不少愛股，如Google, Facebook, 一部份Alibaba, 一部份騰訊等等。Naked short calls犯了新手玩options的錯，沒有冷靜地去投資，過度投機，像着了魔似的。所幸的事，人還在，經過今次，要好好自我檢討。

先說說經過。

在一月中，我看到美國和香港的股市去到非常高的水平，一堆work from home股完全脫離價值，而舊經濟股開始慢慢價值回歸(我那時主要看能源和酒旅)，我一邊想對沖市場的亢奮，一邊想看看有甚麼舊經濟股可以追落後，所以我踏上了賣calls賣puts的不歸路，一邊賣舊經濟股的puts如GEO、CXW、CCL, 一邊賣新經濟股的calls如DASH, ABNB, ZOOM, TSLA, PTON等等。

二月初，Gamestop和一眾wallstreetbets股高位回落，我看到機會(看到坑!)，決定用naked short calls賺取烏合之眾人踩人、股票下跌時的錢。GME、AMC、FUBO、BB都有賣calls。

這些期權交易，基本上所有都賺錢，我以為自己懂得玩這個遊戲了。由於wsb股大部份跌得七七八八，我只在Gamestop上還有short calls。

悲劇在美國2月24號發生。

Gamestop由開盤~$45，當天爆上接近$100。我的calls strike price都是$200或以上，2月26號到期，我覺得是很穩的，但interactive brokers不是這樣想，Current Excess Liquidity急降，甚至變負，我急急賣一部份股票以免爆倉。那時我GME calls nominal value大概是NAV的50%吧。GME calls的bid和ask閃來閃去，如果cover的話，NAV虧10-20%。我認為GME很難去到$200以上，就算真的$200以上，也應該不會高到我虧10-20%NAV的地步。沒有斬GME calls止蝕，是一個很大的錯誤。

真正的悲劇應該是2月25號吧，Gamestop當天爆上$150以上然後回落，到我反應過來知道應該斬GME calls的時候，已經太遲了，Gamestop連同options停止交易。這時我犯了另外一個錯誤，就是沒有在收市前平掉其他期權。美國收市後，我有一部份資金在GME以外的期權上，還有港股和不能盤後交易的HT preferred shares、GEO bonds，看着GME收市後從$80繼續上升，Current Excess Liquidity急降，翻紅了幾次，唯一可以應對的是賣美股，但我想到了另一個方法，就是買GME股，把naked short calls變covered calls...事情並不順利。Current Excess Liquidity下降是因為GME short calls，買正股的話對沖了風險，按道理是越買Current Excess Liquidity越升，可惜IB不是這樣想，我買了GME calls三份一的正股就不夠buying power再買，就算把手持的美股賣得七七八八buying power也沒有升上去。好不容易，在美股賣剩能源股後，終於捱到盤後交易完結。

2月26號港股開了後，立刻把所有港股賣了套現，剩下當天停止了交易的6098碧桂園服務。這時，70% NAV是GME，35% NAV是主要是HT-C、GEO bonds、能源股和6098，還有10% NAV現金，和一堆short calls/puts。Buying power是0，Current Excess Liquidity差不多紅色，明天GME再爆上去的話基本上我就GG了，差不多有寫遺書的準備。

2月26號美國盤前開了，曙光出現了，IB重新計算了Current Excess Liquidity而大增，GME沒有爆升，反而有點軟，我立刻買入GME把所有GME naked short calls變成covered calls...真諷刺，這時我變了GME大好友...

美股開市後，把GME以外的期權差不多全平了，再unwind了GME正股和short calls，把資金買入能源股ET和KMI，打算收息讓自己冷靜一下再等機會買回失去的股票。美股收市後，組合沒有槓杆，ET+KMI佔NAV 65%，現金NAV 5%，6098 NAV 4%，HT-C NAV 20%，其餘是少許GEO bonds和美股：BRK, STOR, TWTR (因為有covered calls所以沒賣)。今天與2月23號比，NAV下降了30%，主要是因為買入的GME價格太高而GME在2月26號下跌...我沒有如Bill Hwang般創下人類最大單日損失，不過都夠慘了。Short calls的GME strike price都$200以上，GME並沒有爆上到那個程度，但因為volatility上升，gamma squeeze，margin calls累到我雞毛鴨血，意料之外。

不幸中之大幸，一堆增長股在我香港時間2月26號拋售後開始因為美債息上升而殺估值，之前持有的股票下跌10-40%，重倉的能源股沒怎麼升，但也沒有跌。我把能源股賣了一部份，把那些增長股買回，還做了一堆short puts。Baidu的puts賣了太多，重倉strike price $240, $250, $260都給Bill Hwang爆倉時所有價都打穿了，剩下$200的沒穿，只好再賣一些ET去接貨。

季尾時Baidu佔了NAV三分一，真沒想到。在4月1號因為要接BABA的貨($230 puts)，所以把ET全賣掉，BABA佔NAV 17.81%。

今季買入了一堆高風險的增長股，它們各有所長，增長高，但沒有很寬的護城河，大部份業務在虧損階段，P/S, P/E過高，需要持續高增長幾年和增加net profit margin才可以撐得住當前市場給的價格。這些股票我只會每只買一點，加起來當是一個迷你組合。

未來我仍然會繼續摸索short calls和puts，主要是因為我覺得持有volatility高，增長高的股票去賣期權，比持有穩定收息股upside更高。

血的教訓

• 不要沽空。幾季前已經決定不做空了，今季用naked short calls感覺不同，沒有理智地拒絕，慘痛。

• 分散投資。無論多有信心，都應該分散。賣期權後在方向對的時候，不要加倉再賣，沒必要去追最後一個銅板。

• 正股不做短線。心理承受不了，決定我賺不到短線的錢。賣期權賺的時間值，不完全算是短線錢，心理沒那麼緊張。

IV. 2021年第一季的個股持倉短評

加減符號代表今個季度加了或是減了倉。

9988/BABA (Alibaba) (-)

強勁護城河，而護城河因為不斷投資其他公司而加強。隨著中國online shopping的繼續增長，可以長期持有，股票屬於一般風險，高回報。

因為GME上的失誤拋售了很多，希望不久未來可以買回一點。

BIDU (+)

在中國，搜索、地圖、翻譯、雲盤都是第一，智能音箱數一數二、自動駕駛更是領頭羊，市值不足$100 billion USD，因為單有技術，執行能力差，市場不賣脹。我認為它的自動駕駛系統已經跟貼Waymo，在中國應該是無人能及，公司的人工智能技術國內數一數二，單是自動駕駛這一部份已經值$30-$100 billion，現價option value高。

今季平均價大概$250買入，給puts assign的股票比預期多，在短期內應該會減一減磅。

PDD (+)

主要是用來對沖阿里在電商給反壟斷制衡的風險。貨找人的電商模式，再用補貼搶客戶，能不能維持是未知之數，但拚多多已經給了我很多意料之外，未來可能有更多顛覆電商市場的手段。

UPST (+)

用人工智能幫中、小銀行做loan underwriting，標榜可以給銀行放貸給更多客戶，而風險不會增加。成功與否要用時間去証明，但現在確實是找到越來越多的合作銀行。

今季$50-$70入貨，都全部附加了10月到期的$100 covered calls,所以現在$100以上價格我沒有享受到。

TWTR (+)

很多出名的公眾人物如Elon Musk, Donald Trump，一些政治和投資大V，各行各業的人才，都在Twitter上分享自己想法，很多公司也會用Twitter來發佈消息，和用戶交流，所以Twitter的potential非常高，要看執行怎樣了。

今季$55-$70左右入貨。

VIOT (+)

小米產品性價比高，在智能產品這一方面有很大吸引力，因為一般人願意花錢在貴的電話，但對智能產品的價格還是比較敏感，畢竟不是必需品。雲米(Viomi)主要負責小米的智能家電，我認為在小米眾多產品中最有未來。

TUYA (+)

IoT平台公司，有少少像Shopify在電商的定位，幫一些沒有自己IoT infra的公司去做IoT產品的軟件支持。產品依附在雲公司上，如AWS, Google Cloud，所以利潤一般般，苦逼生意。風險是雲公司的vertical integration，或大客戶自己做IoT infra不用付費給Tuya，所以Tuya價格一定要保持competitve，還要想一些創造network effect的方法去保持競爭優勢。另一方面，產品要有夠彈性支持客戶獨特的需求。

今季在IPO價$21買一點點。

CRWD (+)

Crowdstrike在雲服務保安中算是龍頭，在幾單美國駭客事件中也可以看到它在調查上的角式。我對它的市值有懷疑，覺得太貴，所以只買一點點觀察。

ARLO (+)

由Netgear分拆出來，智能保安產品公司，其中DIY攝像頭的產品最受歡迎，功能較齊全，評價高，雖然保安DIY產品市場份額由2017年的31%跌到2019年的26%，但這個市場的不斷擴張，人們對家中保安的意識越來越高，Arlo相信會保持高增長，越來越賺錢。

2020年gross profit有50%增長，公司的付費模式越來越成功，付費用戶2020年增加89%，相信扭虧為盈指日可待。

Insider在2020-2021在$7-$8都有買，我今季在$8附近也買入了一點。P/S大概2, 不太貴。

KMI (-)

Kinder Morgan (KMI) 這支midstream能源股在2015年大跌，主要是由於之前在capital allocation上的失誤，致使債務太多，分發的股息太多，不夠自由現金流。不過，公司業務有sticky customers，本身規模和經驗造就了少少護城河，在業務上的現金流其實很穩定，加上insiders持股多，CEO年薪$1。Pipelines是一種頗有彈性的資產，可以用少少改良就可以改方向，和其他管道連接，除了運gas、fuels外，還可以運再生能源有關的hydrogen、biodiesel、ethanol等等。

第四季DCF同比下降8%，主要受上游因新冠而減產影響。2021年股息由$1.05加到$1.08，少於之前說的$1.25，有點失望，但管理層打算更積極地減債，有剩的會用來回購股票，也不是一個壞主意。DCF/dividend 2x，非常穩。全年來說，DCF -8%, EBITDA -9%，新冠影響demand，沒有辦法，公司回購了$50 million的股票，有點少。Net debt/EBITDA ~ 4.6x, 沒甚麼大轉變，大概是公司會保持的位置。

Outlook方面：2021年公司的現金流會相當平均地用在growth capex、股息、回購、減債。公司透明度非常高，業務穩，年初就可以把整年的現金流預測了出來。預計$6.8 billion EBITDA (2020年 $6.9 billion, 2019年 $7.6 bllion), $4.4 billion DCF (每股$1.95), $0.8 billion 用來growth capex, $2.4 billion 股息 (每股$1.08)，剩下$1.2 billion會分$750 million用來減債，$450 million用來回購。以$35 billion的市值(每股$15)來看，雖然沒有增長，但DCF yield 4.4/35 = 12.5%，個人認為是非常保守的估計，所以現價十分低估。EV/EBITDA = (debt+equity)/EBITDA = ($32+$35)/$6.9 ~ 9.7x

BRK (-)

沒甚麼好介紹的巴郡，超低風險，不過預計回報只是一般，因為巴菲特近來做的投資都不是執便宜貨的例子，保險業的競爭也有點大。

HT Preferreds (-)

Hersha Hospitality Trust的優先股，之前有一些公司和優先股的分析這裡不重複。受新冠影響，入住率估計跌到20%以下，但我判定為暫時性問題，新冠過後會重派息，

今季返回接近$25的par value，會在不久將來全清倉。

STOR (-)

Store Capital Corporation。獨立商戶的triple-net lease REIT。它的其中一個特色是很著重租戶的財務和盈利，有絕大部份商戶的財務資料來減低風險。管理層有多年經驗，作風保守，對各行業的商戶分散，對公司的業績披露和業績算是相當透明，有少少護城河。Howard Marks的Oaktree Capital是這股的其中一間founding institution，但現在沒有持有股票。巴郡在2017年入股了接近10%，可見管理層受到巴菲特的認同。巴菲特2020八月再次加倉保持擁有10%的公司，可見公司一直給巴菲特看好。

因為GME上的失誤拋售了很多，現價不會買入，剩下的應該會長期持有。

700(騰訊) (-)

中國主要社交軟件，互聯網多佈局，強大護城河。我認為它是在中國唯一可以和阿里爸爸抗衡的公司，不過人才和技術方面不及阿里，靠產品的用戶黏性搭夠。

因為GME上的失誤拋售了很多，希望不久未來可以買回一點。

6098(碧桂園服務) (+)

國內龍頭住宅物業管理公司，憑着母公司碧桂園供給物業來管理，每年每股利潤增長50%+，母公司地儲在行內數一數二，預計未來幾年也可以有30-50%的增長，輕資產，躺着賺錢的公司。

一月時$62左右加了丁點倉。

1211(比亞廸) (+)

中國電池的先行者，新能源車龍頭，全球市場份額~10%，國內~20%。電池供應方面會開始供應其他車廠，未來有機會追到寧德時代。混合能源車和全電車是未來，而比亞廸會是這個未來的一個主要成員。

價格比較高，大概是$210買入一點觀察。

3690(美團) (+)

美團在中國外賣市場已經是無人能及，這個平台利潤其實不怎麼樣，算是苦逼生意，但正因為利潤低，沒有太多厲害地對手。從千團大戰突圍而出，可以看出美團是苦逼生意中的高手。如果阿里在物流方面用人工智能有所突破，餓了麼有機會翻盤，但暫時還沒有跡象。買入美團算是我用來對沖阿里的一着。

今季$286買了一點。

9923(移卡) (+)

8083(有贊) (+)

2013(微盟) (+)

這三只股票算是大包圍saas服務公司，它們主要支持依靠微訊小程序生態的線下商店，每間公司只有幾billion美元的市值，如果其中一間跑出做成真正的龍頭，回報會相當不錯。最大風險是騰訊把這些業務自己做，畢竟騰訊也有騰訊雲，未來可能會做多些toB工具，就像阿里的淘寶生態，差不多是阿里全包辦，沒有給第三方公司太大的賺錢空間。不過，騰訊有投資這三間公司，而且騰訊比較喜歡和其他公司一起做生意，所以這三間公司來自騰訊的風險不會太高。

6618(京東健康) (+)

241 (阿里健康) (+)

大包圍中國的醫療服務和物流創新。京東在物流方面有優勢，阿里在流量和科技上有優勢，不清楚哪個會勝出。或者可能像電商一樣，它們會並存，有錢大家賺。

2269(藥明生物) (+)

提供雙抗研究facility的龍頭公司。沒有太多研究，抄功課的股票。

3738(阜博) (+)

Content IP (intellectual property)保護的公司，主要是防止影片侵權，幫creators收錢。影片平台如youtube有自己的維權系統，所以我不太清楚第三方在這個niche market的位置。阜博在中國是龍頭，買少少看看，抄功課股。